

SOVIET VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST

- o Desire not to see Iran emerge victorious. From Moscow's point of view, a victorious Iran not only would undermine Soviet influence in Baghdad, but also probably would make the Khomeini regime even less susceptible to Soviet inroad or pressure and free up assets that could be used to support the Afghanistan mujahedin. Moreover, the Iran's desire to spread Islamic fundamentalism would pose a greater threat to the USSR's approximately 45 million Muslims.
- o An Iraq victory might accelerate Baghdad's turn toward the West and loosen its dependence on Soviet arms.
- o Desire not to see the war expand beyond the Iran and Iraqi borders. The Soviets would be very concerned that such a turn of events would bolster the US role and presence in the Persian Gulf.

MOSCOW'S TILT TOWARD BAGHDAD

- o Moscow's tilt began in 1982 with the signing of a \$2 billion arms deal and the ending of the 1980 arms embargo which failed to entice Iran into closer relations, failed to pressure Iraq to end the war, and soured ties to Baghdad.
 - o Moscow provides over 50% of Iraq's arms and most of its most sophisticated weapons systems.
 - o Soviet advisors may assist the Iraqi military in some tactical planning.
 - o Soviet and East European arms sales to Iran include only small arms and ammunition and if totally stopped would not negatively affect Iran's ability to conduct the war. Moscow probably continues the supply to help keep the door open on better prospects for the future in Iran. Our best evidence indicates Moscow does not sanction arms transfers to Iran from Libya and Syria.
- [REDACTED]
- o Since 1982 Soviet leaders and Soviet media have criticized Iran's position on the war, calling it senseless, absurd, and illogical; and supported Iraq's expressed willingness to negotiate a settlement. They have also welcomed Arab League delegations in Moscow which have sought support for ending the war.

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HOW WOULD MOSCOW WANT THE WAR TO END?

- o Peaceful negotiations.
- o Iran's position that Saddam Husayn be replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist leader be dropped.
- o Whatever territory agreements Iran and Iraq signed probably would be acceptable to the Soviets...No loss of territory by either side most likely the best chance of succeeding...a return to internationally recognized borders...Although the Soviets did not like the 1975 Algiers Accord--because they played no role in brokering it--they probably would like the agreement enforced. This would not be a make-or-break issue, however, if all other issues were settled.
- o The removal of foreign (US) forces from the region also possibility or joint (US and USSR) observer status.

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Estimated Numbers of Soviet Diplomatic, Military, and
Economic Personnel in the Middle East, 1985

<u>Country</u>	<u>Diplomatic</u> (Not including dependents)	<u>Military</u> (Advisers & Technicians)	<u>Economic</u> (Advisers & Technicians)	<u>Total</u>
Afghanistan	130	2000*	5000	7130
Algeria	80	800	6000	6880
Bahrain	0	0	0	0
Egypt	170	0	200	370
Iran	40	0	1400	1440
Iraq	50	1000	5000	6050
Israel	0	0	0	0
Jordan	20	35	0	55
Kuwait	40	15	0	55
Lebanon	40	0	0	40
Libya	50	2000	5000	7050
Mauritania	20	0	0	20
Morocco	120	0	175	295
Oman	0	0	0	0
Qatar	0	0	0	0
Sudan	20	0	0	20
Syria	90	3000	1000	4090
Tunisia	130	0	240	370
Turkey	150	0	1500	1650
UAE	0	0	10	10
Yemen, North	150	500	175	825
Yemen, South	30	1500	550	2080

*In addition, there are approximately 115,000 Soviet combat forces in Afghanistan.

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